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"It's Our Turn to East, The Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower" by Michela Wrong, A Review
By Andrew Palmer
Feb 11, 2010 - 8:56:52 AM
pub. Fourth Estate, London, 2009
This important book has recently been issued in paperback, and
anyone who has any interest in Africa, the International “Aid” industry
and the impact of corruption should read this well-written and
researched book.
The central theme of this book is the nature of corruption in Kenya
and the story of how John Githongo, who had accepted the position of
Permanent Secretary in Charge of Governance and Ethnics in the new
administration of President Kibaki and the NARC party.
The NARC (National Rainbow Coalition) government replaced the
immensely corrupt administration of President Daniel arap Moi, and the
KANU party and ended its 39 years in power. During his inauguration at
Uhuru Park, Nairobi, on the 30th December 2002, President
Kibaki said, “I am inheriting a country that has been badly damaged by
years of misrule and ineptitude” and warned that he would respect no
sacred cows in the drive to eliminate sleaze. He added that,
“Corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya.” Michela Wrong
adds, “Whenever I hear it today, I notice a tiny detail that passed me
by as I stood in that sweaty scrum, smeared notebook in hand, mentally
drafting the day’s article: Kibaki, always a laboured speaker, slightly
fumbles the word ‘cease’. Lisped, it comes out sounding very much like
‘thief’.”
However, this book is not really about John Githongo, although the
author provides a detailed account of his life and the factors which
lead him to expose the corruption of President Kibaki’s team. It is
also not wholly about Kenya, rather she uses the facts which John
Githongo exposes to weave a tale which involves the aid policies of
western governments, and the actual indifference of governments, like
Britain’s, to corruption. Then at the end of the book she interweaves
the events of the 2008 Kenyan election, which was rigged by the NARC,
to make the case that corruption undermines the entire system and that
once politicians start “eating”, to use the Kenyan expression, there is
no clear point at which they can stop, and stealing elections is merely
another milestone on the road of duplicity, which they chose when they
came into power.
It is wise to see this book as unveiling a series of onion skins;
NARC corruption, then tribalism, the international complicity, then the
loss of the rule of law and the markers along the road to civil
conflict and ultimately to the status of a failed state. Kenya has not
yet moved to that destination, but as Michela Wrong notes towards the
end of this book:
“’The reason Al Qaeda came here in
the 1990s wasn’t for the scenery; [US] Ambassador Bellamy told me. ‘If
you can lie your way through immigration, if you can get your goods
through customs, if you can induce law enforcement to turn the other
way, if you can sort out your legal problems with a few attorneys and
judges, if you can launder your money and invest in legitimate
businesses, well, why wouldn’t you come to Kenya?’ And if Al
Qaeda found Kenya a congenial environment, thanks to the ease with
which officialdom could be bought, then so did global criminal
syndicates, drug traffickers and warlords wanted by international war
crimes tribunals. In the final stretch of his own posting, Bellamy had
reached the same stage of hair-tearing exasperation as [former UK High
Commissioner] Edward Clay before him. ‘The raid on the Standard
was the nadir. It’s like watching a Greek tragedy, in which the
protagonists are doomed from the start to take the wrong stand at every
turn.’ The country had become a land of opportunity for the
international underworld. Later that year, British Foreign Office
minister Kim Howells revealed that Kenya had become a major transit
point for drugs traded on British streets, with nearly a dozen domestic
drugs seizures proving to have Kenyan links. Those at the top had bent
the rules so often they could no longer tell the difference between the
legal and the illicit.”
Corruption is a slippery slope, as has often been noted. It’s easy
to start on the course, but once started there is no obvious off-ramp.
Corruption literally undermines states, talk about deploying military
forces to “deal with” failed states, like Somalia and Afghanistan, may
be a commonplace of Washington briefings, but the reality is that the
integrity of states requires boring things like good governance, an
honest police force, and the acceptance that no one is above the law,
no matter what their position, or their ethnic background, or social
position.
Michela Wrong & John Githongo
This is a lesson that western states, not only African states, need
to remember. It is western companies that, in the main, pay huge bribes
for the sale of aircraft, military equipment and massive projects. Yet,
Tony Blair was happy to stop the UK authorities pressing corruption
charges against BAe, in respect of its Saudi Arabian activities,
because this was “not in the public interest”. The billions of pounds,
dollars and euros taken by African leaders from their people are not
placed in banks in Africa, instead it finds its home in London and
Zurich, and in the other great financial centres of the west, and
western lawyers and accountants are more than ready to accommodate
their African clients.
As Michela Wrong writes:
“Donors would do better focusing on
removing the beam form their own eye, by targeting the Western
companies, lawyers’ chambers and banks which make it possible for
crooked African leaders to spirit hundreds of millions of dollars out
of the continent each year. Deepak Kamani and his brother Rashmi,
suspected of involvement in a dozen Anglo Leasing contracts, regard
Britain as a second home.”
The experience of John Githongo, as Michela Wrong makes clear, tells
us lessons about the wider world, not only about the realities of
modern Kenya. If we see political corruption as a specific African
problem, which we need no concern ourselves with, arguing that this has
always been the case and that the money will slowly trickle down to the
poor we are ignoring the facts, as Michela Wrong makes clear. President
Kibaki’s administration has ensured that the main beneficiaries of the
corruption that affects Kenya so profoundly, are a relatively small
group of men from the Kikuyu tribe; as she says, writing about the
violence that erupted after the 2008 election:
“Some Western reports wrote of
‘atavistic tribal tensions’ bubbling to the surface, implying the
hostility between Kenya’s communities was a mindless, irrational thing.
But under a system which decreed that all advancement was determined by
tribe, such hostility was entirely rational. Had all Kenyans believed
that they enjoyed equal access to state resources, there would have
been no explosion. As Bill Clinton said in another context: ‘It’s the
economy, stupid.’
This violence was horribly up-close
and personal. In Korogocho, Mathare, Dandore and Kibera, neighbour
raped neighbour, husband murdered wife, schoolmate killed schoolmate.”
Michela Wrong draws the chain of causation clearly, the killings in
2008 have their origins in the corruption of the NARC government, and
the way in which the Kikuyus running that government ensured that they
and their community benefitted at every opportunity. She says, “It was
other’s turn to now share John Githongo’s revelation. ‘People are
beginning to realise it’s not a question of Kibaki being misled by
hardliners around him,’ one investment expert told me. ‘He is the
hardliner’.” She describes how Kenya divided itself in 2008 on the
basis of tribe:
“Even the health system showed signs
of Balkanisation, with ODM supporters checking into hospitals where
they were sure not to be treated by Kikuyu staff. The voluntary zoning,
first symptom of national disintegration, took place to begin with
irrespective of class and income.
Kenya’s crisis could be encapsulated
in a single archetypal image: a Toyota pick-up, piled high with
mattresses, a chest of drawers in one corner, bed frame in the other
and a medley of pots, pans and plastic bowls in between.”
Look north to Somalia and you can see where such a process can lead.
It’s obviously worth also understanding the details of Kenyan
corruption, the way in which KANU had benefitted from the Goldenberg
scam and the Anglo Leasing scandal which was the vehicle by which the
NARC party followers enriched themselves, a scandal which John Githongo
slowly revealed and documented. The author says that the essence of
Kenyan corruption was that well “only a tiny elite got obscenely rich
on the back of it”, many others benefitted from a wider distribution of
“gifts by the corrupt.
The author records in detail how John Githongo was reluctant to
believe that the President himself was involved in schemes like Anglo
Leasing, and regularly briefed Kibaki on the progress of his
investigations. Finally it became clear to him that a small group of
men around the President, whose activities were well-know to Kibaki,
were responsible for corruption on a huge scale. John, himself a
Kikuyu, was expected to allow his tribe to “eat” from the trough.
Michela Wrong writes:
“As he stumbled on lie after lie,
John continued briefing the president on what he was learning. On the
morning of 18 June [2004], noting that Kibaki seemed in high spirits,
John decided the time had come to make his pitch. Circumstantial
evidence kept pointing to the same players, he told the president over
breakfast. Given the shambolic nature of Kenya’s judicial system, the
matter could not safely be left to the law. A political gesture was
necessary; heads must roll.
He had overreached himself. Looking
across at the man he admired, John caught an expression he had never
seen before: Kibaki seemed, well, sheepish. Like a boy caught with his
hand in a biscuit tin. The president urged John to slow down.”
The Anglo Leasing scandal showed that Kenyans needed to take no
lessons from the Nigerians when it came to organizing scams. This
involved, as far as John knew, eighteen separate deals for equipment
and services supplied by a company with a Liverpool address, as the
author says:
“It didn’t take a genius to work out
what was really going on. The Anglo Leasing contracts were a crude
device for extracting large wads of money from the Kenyan treasury.
Where the funds would eventually end up was anyone’s guess, but it was
safe to assume they would be split between those in government who
authorised the deals and the entrepreneurs who provided the necessary
camouflage by setting up a range of respectable-sounding shell
companies and credit provider – ‘looting pipes’, John called them.”
John Githongo
What this book also makes clear, apart from the ease with which the
incoming NARC administration were able to mirror the corruption of
their predecessors, if not surpass it, was the fact that international
donor organizations were, in the main, indifferent to reports of
corruption, despite public statements to the contrary. The anger with
which the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) greeted
the attempts of the UK High Commissioner to Kenya, Sir Edward Clay, to
highlight the problem of corruption, shows that the imperative of such
organizations was to meet distribution targets to “help Africa”, rather
than ensure that the money was honestly spent. Other organizations,
including the World Bank, took a similar line. As Michela Wrong says:
“DfID had promised the British
electorate, and the rest of the G8, that it would massively increase
aid. But once you subtracted oil- and mineral- rich African states that
didn’t need foreign aid, then removed those who were undoubtedly
dirt-poor but whose governments were considered beyond the pale, the
list of governments meeting the criteria for partnership became
embarrassingly short. ….
Small wonder, given these various
factors, that DfID in 2004 had little appetite for the antics of a high
commissioner who appeared to have launched a personal; crusade against
government venality in a key African ally. ‘They found it an
embarrassing obstacle, because it got in their way of their plans to
spend more,’ says Clay. ‘They found it unpalatable to have an
ambassador who had a high-profile role on it and was not going to pipe
down’.”
In short this book uncovers a series of issues, like a set of
Russian dolls, you open one and another is inside. I feel that you
cannot afford not to read this book, even if Kenya is not your first
interest. It deals with the relationships of states and the effects of
corruption in undermining the values by which states need to be
governed, if they are to retain the allegiance of their citizens and
maintain their integrity. The dangers of corruption are, as Michela
Wrong so clearly points out, that, “Corruption can reach a point – ….
where an entire nation is there for the taking, where sleaze has
security implications not just for the nation concerned, but for its
neighbours and allies.” If you are interested in the process by which
states fail this book signposts the route they take.
Finally, once you have read this book, and understood the role of
western donors and financial institutions in facilitating corruption in
Africa, you will no longer be able to claim that Africans are
institutionally corrupt, the greedy politicians and businessmen work
hand in hand with westerners; this is a global problem, not merely an
African one. Western governments also have skeletons in their
cupboards, they may just be better at hiding them: we need more John
Githongos, in London, Paris, Bonn and Washington.
I should also mention the excellent review of “It’s Our Turn to Eat” in the New York Review of Books (14th January 2010) by Jeffrey Gettleman, “East Africa: The Most Corrupt Country.”
Joshua Hammer also reviewed the book July 2009 in The New York Times
– http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/books/review/Hammer-t.html
“It’s Our Turn to Eat” is available from Amazon.co.uk and Amazon.com
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